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Abstract
This paper shows that fairness concerns are a stand-alone driver of self-reporting as part of
optimal law enforcement. If society cares about individuals who are wrongly acquitted or are
wrongly convicted, self-reporting is advantageous. This continues to hold as we allow for
fairness concerns regarding the sanction applied to convicted offenders. We furthermore
show that the addition of the traditional enforcement costs argument unambiguously lowers
the self-reporting sanction in comparison to the case in which only fairness aspects are
considered.
The author is grateful for helpful comments by Florian Baumann and Eberhard Feess.
Citation: Friehe, Tim, (2006) "Fairness and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement." Economics Bulletin, Vol. 11, No. 2 pp.
1-7
Submitted: September 30, 2006.  Accepted: December 18, 2006.
URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2006/volume11/EB-06K40046A.pdf1 Introduction
Individuals who committed criminal acts sometimes report their own violations to authorities.
These o￿enders who self-report are frequently sanctioned less than others. Several e￿ciency
reasons for the widespread use of this practice have been advanced in the literature. Kaplow
and Shavell (1994a) analyze this feature of real-life law enforcement and ￿nd that it creates
savings in enforcement costs as self-reporting individuals do not need to be detected and inves-
tigated. Further, self-reporting can reduce risk-bearing costs as the probabilistic sanction can
be exchanged for a certain sanction. Innes (1999, 2000, 2001) complements these advantages.
Innes (1999) highlights that self-reporters will take remediation e￿orts, which can be bene￿cial
in the case of environmental harm, for instance. Innes (2000) considers o￿enders who di￿er
in their apprehension probability. As enforcement e￿ort and sanctions prove as quite crude
instruments if the enforcement authority cannot observe the o￿ender type, self-reporting can
￿ne-tune enforcement by avoiding overdeterrence of easily apprehended individuals without af-
fecting deterrence of the remaining individuals. Finally, Innes (2001) shows that self-reporting
leads to savings in avoidance costs. 1
We show that fairness considerations are a stand-alone driver of self-reporting as part of
optimal law enforcement. Thus, the conception of welfare applied here allows for fairness con-
cerns since they a￿ect individual well-being, as is argued by Kaplow and Shavell (2002:293), for
instance. We capture fairness by error costs. 2 Courts often su￿er from imperfect information.
For instance, evidence may prove incomplete or be subject to misinterpretation. Legal errors
are one consequence and can materialize by leaving the guilty unpunished or convicting the
innocent.3 Most individuals will conceive of it as alarmingly unfair if a detected o￿ender walks
free due to legal error, leave alone the incarceration of an innocent.
Our ￿nding, holding enforcement e￿ort constant, is that law enforcement optimally employs
self-reporting because social costs are reduced by fewer errors. In the minimization of social
costs, the e￿ect of lower self-reporting sanctions concerning violation incentives is initially too
small to counter the e￿ect based on error costs. Thus, some self-reporting of o￿enders is cost
minimizing.
In the next section, we illustrate the workings of self-reporting in varied frameworks all char-
acterized by heterogeneity of o￿enders regarding the total detection and conviction probability.
Modeling o￿ender heterogeneity is asked for since it entails the result of partial self-reporting,
which is obviously more descriptive of reality than the outcome that all o￿enders either self-
report or do not report. Besides fairness captured by error costs in our basic model, we also
supply a model in which inequitable treatment of o￿enders causes costs. Another variation
is the additional consideration of the traditional motive, enforcement cost savings, in order to
1Further work on self-reporting with little relation to this study is provided by Feess and Walzl (2005)
who examine what e￿ects result if there are two stages at which self-reporting can occur, before detection and
after detection but before conviction. Besides, Feess and Walzl (2004) analyze e￿ects if there is a team of two
o￿enders, who may behave cooperatively or noncooperatively after the act, and Feess and Walzl (forthcoming)
analyze the impact of o￿ender heterogeneity on the optimal self-reporting scheme.
2Kaplow and Shavell (1994a) already touch upon errors and self-reporting. They ￿nd that savings in en-
forcement e￿ort by virtue of self-reporting can turn out even higher than in a frame without errors because of
the likely increase in enforcement e￿ort necessary to counter the deterrence dilution due to legal error. Our
model is also related to that by Kaplow and Shavell (1994b). They consider errors in the context of optimal
law enforcement but model the imposition of sanctions as costly per se, whereas in our model (i) the imposition
is costly if it is perceived as unfair and (ii) the failure to impose a sanction on o￿enders is costly too.
3References Polinsky and Shavell (1989) refer to estimate the probability of a legal error to be about one to
eight.
1determine whether both factors, fairness and enforcement cost savings, combine to even lower
self-reporting sanctions. Concluding, we show that our result also holds in a framework in
which the informational structure is changed in direction of that modeled by Innes (2000), that
is, heterogeneity ex ante. Section 3 o￿ers concluding comments.
2 The Model and Analysis
2.1 Assumptions
The model builds on Feess and Heesen (2002). 4 Risk-neutral individuals decide whether to
commit an o￿ense that generates bene￿t b and harm h. Bene￿ts are private information and
vary among potential o￿enders according to the density function f[b] and the cumulative density
function F[b] on the support [0;1). The policy maker minimizes total social costs to be de￿ned
more closely in the subsequent subsections. Her means to achieve this end include monetary
sanction s, enforcement e￿ort p 2 (0;1), and the sanction for self-reporters r. The enforcement
e￿ort p may be interpreted as detection probability and causes costs C(p). We assume that p
and s are exogenously given for the sake of simplicity. We consider fairness concerns of society’s
constituents as policy maker’s motive to incentivize self-reporting and capture them by error
costs. Detected innocent individuals are wrongly convicted with probability t 2 (0;1). Detected
o￿enders’ conviction probability, ￿q, depends on the likelihood of rightful conviction q 2 (0;1],
q > t, and the individual’s type ￿ 2 [0;1].5 We consider the speci￿c course of events during
the commission of the act as the factor that introduces heterogeneity, i.e., determines the type
￿. For example, if the undertaking of the act runs smoothly from the criminal’s perspective, it
usually will be more di￿cult to detect and convict this individual than a criminal who failed
to exercise the o￿ense in the way desired. An obvious example is the case in which the o￿ender
knows that his o￿ense has been witnessed, which would imply a ￿ close or equal to one and
make the legal judgment less error prone. The type ￿ is private information received after the
act and distributed according to g[￿], with cumulative density G[￿].6 The expected sanction
for an o￿ender with ￿ = 1 is qps. In consequence, to make self-reporting advantageous for a
nonempty subset of o￿enders, r < qps must hold. The type who is indi￿erent between reporting
and not reporting is ~ ￿ = r=[qps]. Taking this into account before the act, individuals with b ￿ ~ b
￿nd committing the act advantageous, with






g[￿]d￿ ￿ tps: (1)
We assume that nono￿enders never decide to self-report, thus, we require r ￿ tps.
The time sequence is as follows. On the ￿rst stage, the enforcement authority complements
the exogenously given detection probability p and sanction magnitude s with the chosen self-
reporting sanction r. Given that, the individual decides whether to commit the act knowing
b, p, s, r, and the distribution of ￿ but not the actual ￿. The commission of the criminal act
4Models in Feess and Walzl (2005, forthcoming) likewise build on this structure.
5Combining type and conviction probability multiplicatively eases the analysis, see, e.g., Innes (2000). Be-
sides, note that, whereas probabilities t and q are exogenous in this setting, they can be endogenized by a
decision variable k, being e￿ort directed at enhancing accuracy as in Kaplow and Shavell (1994b), without
changing the result.
6The enforcement authority cannot observe the information gathered by the o￿ender, e.g., whether he became
aware of the bystander.
2produces the signal as the undertaking takes its speci￿c course. After the act, o￿enders decide
whether to self-report or not, given the information on ￿. Finally, the enforcement authority
acts as chosen on the ￿rst stage.
2.2 Analysis
We will discuss the result of our basic framework at ￿rst, and then proceed to enrich this
framework in two directions. In the basic model, we allow for error costs as direct costs in the
objective function of the policy maker. In our ￿rst enrichment, we include concerns for equitable
treatment of o￿enders, whether they be self-reporting or not. Second, we consider that total
enforcement costs can be a￿ected by providing self-reporting incentives. Before concluding, we
supply a variant of the basic model in which the type is revealed before the act is committed.
2.2.1 Basic Model
Society dislikes errors not only because they dilute deterrence but also because of fairness
considerations. Social costs re￿ect this in the form of direct error costs besides harm and
enforcement expenditures.7 Speci￿cally, we build in a multiple of the expected sanction imposed
on innocent individuals and of the expected sanction that o￿enders escape from. Social costs 8
SCB consist of the harm and error potential created by o￿enders, the error potential due to
nono￿enders, and enforcement costs.
SC
B = (1 ￿ F[~ b])
"





+ F[~ b]tps￿ + C(p) (2)
For the time being, we exclude what has already been proven as the advantage of self-reporting,
being the reduction in enforcement costs. 9 That is why enforcement costs C(p) are not reduced
if a subset of o￿enders self-report. Note that it lowers social welfare if o￿enders escape from
detection, which is in the spirit of Polinsky and Shavell (2000). 10 The derivative of social costs
in the basic model with respect to r is
SC
B
r =(1 ￿ F[~ b])s￿g[~ ￿]
@~ ￿
@r





h + G[~ ￿](1 ￿ p)s￿ + ps￿
Z ~ ￿
0
(1 ￿ q￿)g[￿]d￿ ￿ tps￿
#
: (3)
For the borderline values ~ b and ~ ￿, it holds respectively that @~ b
@r =
R 1
~ ￿ g[￿]d￿ > 0 and @~ ￿
@r =
1=[qps] > 0. The ￿rst term of the ￿rst-order derivative depicts that less o￿enders self-report in
consequence of a marginal increase in the sanction for self-reporters, which causes error costs
to rise. The second term re￿ects the e￿ect of a marginal increase in r on deterrence. The
change in r increases borderline bene￿t ~ b and thereby induces more individuals to refrain from
7This is likewise done in Lando (2003) and Demougin and Fluet (2005), for instance, who deal with standards
of proof, and in Chu et al. (2000) who deal with repeat o￿enders.
8The objective function does not account for o￿enders bene￿ts, which is, for one, appropriate for some acts,
and, for another, without consequence qualitatively (Feess and Heesen 2002).
9This reduction explains the result of Feess and Heesen (2002), for instance.
10This aspect is, however, not critical for our results.
3the act. Consequently, harm and error costs of o￿enders can be avoided whereas error costs for
incremental innocent individuals are incurred. 11
Proposition 1 Suppose (a) ex post asymmetric information, (b) constant enforcement e￿ort,
and that (c) society cares about type I and type II errors as well as escapes from apprehension,
then some self-reporting lowers social costs.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose self-reporting is not cost minimizing. Then,
r = qps. However, setting r = qps in (3) gives after inserting @~ b














g[1] > 0: (4)
This indicates that lowering r somewhat, that is, introducing self-reporting incentives, decreases
social costs.
We ￿nd that the reduction of error costs is su￿cient to make some self-reporting optimal.
The reason is that lowering r marginally beneath qps will a￿ect deterrence very little, while
social costs are signi￿cantly lowered by the saving in error costs. That is, the increase in social
costs due to the increase in violation incentives is continuous, whereas the reduction owing to
error costs is discrete.
2.2.2 Equitable Treatment of O￿enders
Fairness considerations may apply to the sanctioning of convicted o￿enders as well. Kaplow and
Shavell (1994a) point out that self-reporting implies no enforcement cost savings if the enforce-
ment method is monitoring.12 In that case, two o￿enders, one of which self-reports whereas the
other does not, both cause the same harm to society as they do not a￿ect enforcement costs
di￿erently. In consequence, society may perceive it as unfair if they are treated di￿erently. 13
The introduction of a self-reporting scheme introduces a discrepancy in the expected sanction
for individuals that self-report and those that do not. If this is perceived as unfair, we need
to re￿ect it in social costs. We include a function v[￿] de￿ned on ￿ = qps ￿ r 2 [0;qps], that
represents a dislike for inequitable treatment of o￿enders, v[0] = 0 and v0 > 0.14
The social cost function that allows for this concern reads
SC
E =(1 ￿ F[~ b])
"
h + G[~ ￿](1 ￿ p)s￿ + ps￿
Z ~ ￿
0
(1 ￿ q￿)g[￿]d￿ + (1 ￿ G[~ ￿])v[￿]
#
+ F[~ b]tps￿ + C(p); (5)





and therefore provides incentives to increase r until r = qps holds.
12The example provided by Kaplow and Shavell (1994a: 602) is that of police stationed at the roadside whose
presence cannot be downscaled without a￿ecting deterrence.
13The idea of costs due to a sanction di￿erential is based on Polinsky and Shavell (2000). They introduce a
fairness ideal with respect to sanctioning. Deviations in sanctioning are socially costly and occur in the form of
o￿enders that escape detection and via o￿enders who are detected but convicted with a sanction that deviates
from the fairness ideal.
14Note that capturing ￿ in this way biases against self-reporting. An alternative assumption is that society
includes the type information, for instance, by choosing ^ ￿ = psq
R 1
0 ￿g[￿]d￿ ￿ r ￿ ￿ for every r and given q, p,
and s.
4and yields the following ￿rst-order derivative for the self-reporting sanction;
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h + G[~ ￿](1 ￿ p)s￿ + ps￿
Z ~ ￿
0
(1 ￿ q￿)g[￿]d￿ + (1 ￿ G[~ ￿])v[￿] ￿ tps￿
#
: (6)
We observe three consequences of the additional term. First, fairness costs lower the e￿ect
that higher r deters some individuals from self-reporting and thereby creates expected error
costs since these individuals no longer cause fairness costs. Second, increasing the self-reporting
sanction is bene￿cial since it decreases fairness costs v[￿] that occur due to o￿enders who self-
report. Finally, increasing r increases ~ ￿ which is even more desirable if some o￿enders self
report.
Corollary 1 Suppose (a) ex post asymmetric information, (b) constant enforcement e￿ort,
and that society cares about (c) type I and type II errors and escapes from apprehension, as
well as (d) equitable treatment of o￿enders, then some self-reporting lowers social costs.
Hence, the additional fairness consideration does not a￿ect the desirability of self-reporting in
principle because the marginal costs of lowering r due to function v[￿] bear no weight initially.
The weight attached to marginal costs v0[￿], (1 ￿ G[~ ￿]), and the total magnitude of the term
v[￿] is zero at our margin, that is, at r = qps. Consequently, the ￿rst-order derivative (6
is positive at r = qps and thereby indicates the cost advantages of introducing self-reporting
incentives.
2.2.3 Fairness and Enforcement Costs
In this subsection, we inquire how fairness concerns interact with the reduction in enforcement
e￿ort motive.15 In the analysis so far, we did not consider that self-reporting can reduce the
number of individuals to whom enforcement e￿ort is directed. However, as alluded to above,
enforcement can take di￿erent forms and the expenses of some forms can be drastically reduced
if some individuals self-report, whereas for others, such as monitoring, it might make little or
no di￿erence. To re￿ect this possible impact on enforcement costs in social costs, we implement
a weight ￿ 2 [0;1] attached to the set of self-reporters. Consequently, social costs SCFE are
SC
FE =(1 ￿ F[~ b])
"





+ F[~ b]tps￿ + C(p)
h
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ F[~ b])(1 ￿ G[~ ￿])
i
: (7)
This social cost term is equal to the basic model for ￿ = 0. The new feature in comparison
to the social objective function of the basic model is that enforcement costs with respect to
o￿enders who self-report, (1 ￿F[~ b])(1￿G[~ ￿]), arise only in the amount of (1 ￿￿).16 We obtain
15Keep in mind that Feess and Heesen (2002) show that self-reporting is advantageous in the model applied
here considering only the enforcement cost advantage.
16For instance, a ￿ = 1 can be a consequence of the fact that potential leads of these individuals no longer
need to be investigated.
5the following derivative with respect to r;
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The addition of enforcement cost savings, for one, makes it less desirable to deter individuals
from self-reporting by increasing ~ ￿ through r, and, for another, lowers the detrimental e￿ects
of higher violation incentives because the self-reporters set do not cause full enforcement costs.
Since the consideration of fairness alone already yielded some self-reporting, we ￿nd that the
following result holds.
Proposition 2 Suppose (a) ex post asymmetric information, and (b) that society cares about
type I and type II errors as well as escapes from apprehension, then allowing for enforcement
cost savings in a framework with fairness concerns unambiguously argues for lowering the self-
reporting sanction.
Proof. The introduction of e￿ects via enforcement costs can be captured by increasing
￿ somewhat from zero. Hence, we inquire after the sign of dr
d￿ = ￿
SCr￿
SCrr . Since a minimum
demands SCrr > 0, a decrease of r in ￿ requires SCr￿ > 0. The ￿nding for the cross partial
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Consequently, in line with intuition, fairness combines with enforcement e￿ort savings to
argue for an even lower self-reporting sanction.
2.2.4 Extension: The Case of Ex Ante Heterogeneity
Assume that individuals do not get a private signal ex post but ex ante. This can be reasoned
by referring to di￿erent o￿ender experience, for instance. 17 Hence, varying o￿ender experience
causes di￿erent total detection and conviction probabilities which are foreseeable for individuals
before they act. In this case, individuals decide before the o￿ense whether they will self-report or
not, given that they o￿end. The self-reporting sanction (the individualized expected sanction)
de￿nes the critical bene￿t level for individuals who self-report (do not report) as o￿ender. For
individuals who prefer to self-report, the critical bene￿t level is b￿ = r￿tps, while nonreporters
require ^ b = ps[￿q ￿ t]. The time sequence in this setting is: (1) authority asserts r, (2)
individual observes ￿ and decides whether self-reporting provides the lower expected sanction,
(3) individual learns private information b and makes decision regarding the act, and (4) some
individuals, o￿enders, and nono￿enders will be detected and some of these will be convicted
according to policy variables from stage 1. The cut-o￿ level for the type ￿ is still ~ ￿ = r=qps.
17Experienced criminals might be able to even plant misleading evidence, whereas inexperienced o￿enders
cannot avoid leaving traces.







(h + p(1 ￿ q￿)￿s + (1 ￿ p)￿s)f[b]dbg[￿]d￿
+ h(1 ￿ G[~ ￿])(1 ￿ F[b
￿]) + tps￿
n
(1 ￿ G[~ ￿])F[b
￿] + G[~ ￿]F[^ b]
o
+ C(p): (10)
Respective components of costs are: (i) harm and error potential of non-reporters who use
cut-o￿ level ^ b, (ii) harm of self-reporters who use cut-o￿ level b￿, (iii) the expected error costs
with respect to individuals who do not commit the o￿ense, and (iv) enforcement costs.
This objective function has the following derivative with respect to r;
SC
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￿]) ￿ (1 ￿ F[b








(1 ￿ G[~ ￿])[h ￿ tps￿]: (11)
An increase in the sanction for self-reporters increases ~ ￿. Consequently, more individuals take ^ b
as the relevant cut-o￿ bene￿t level and create expected error costs. Furthermore, the borderline
bene￿t b￿, relevant for self-reporters, increases, which lowers social costs by the harm corrected
for the error potential of innocent individuals. We obtain the con￿rmation of our general ￿nding
in this framework as well.
Corollary 2 Suppose (a) ex ante asymmetric information, (b) constant enforcement e￿ort,
and that (c) society cares about type I and type II errors as well as escapes from apprehension,
then some self-reporting lowers social costs.
We refer to (11), in which inserting r = qps leaves only
SC
Ante
r (r = qps) =
(1 ￿ pq)
pq
￿(1 ￿ F[^ b])g[1] > 0; (12)
so that introducing self-reporting incentives is again desirable.
3 Conclusion
A commonly observed feature of law enforcement is that o￿enders who report their acts to
enforcement authorities are ’rewarded’ by a reduction in the sanction. The widespread use in
several jurisdictions suggests this practice to be advantageous. In the literature starting with
Kaplow and Shavell (1994a), several advantages of observed lower sanctions for self-reporters
have been established. We show that fairness is another factor that argues in favor of self-
reporting in models with ex ante or ex post heterogeneity of o￿enders. What is more, self-
reporting is optimal due to fairness even if there is no other advantage. The result continues
to hold if di￿erences in expected sanctions applied to convicted o￿enders who self-report and
those who do not go to society’s detriment. If we consider e￿ects of enforcement e￿ort besides
fairness, we can con￿rm the intuition that the combination of motives yields an unambiguously
lower self-reporting ￿ne than fairness alone.
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